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1. INTRODUCTION
THE ‘Doha Development Agenda’ of November 2001 puts poverty-reducingeconomic growth at the centre of the WTO’s considerations. If the develop-
ment focus of the Doha Round is to be a meaningful operating principle, then the
overriding task of the round must be to ensure that the liberalisation agreements
promote development in poor countries. In practice this means prioritising reforms
which yield the largest beneﬁts to developing countries; helping governments
move towards good trade policies; and dealing effectively with the implement-
ation constraints faced by poor members.
A prerequisite for the ﬁrst of these objectives is comprehensive analysis and
comparison of the different effects of various reform proposals. Yet there is
surprisingly little economic analysis of the precise consequences of potential
trade agreements on participant countries. Where analytical studies have been
done, they have not penetrated into the core of negotiations and do not seem to
play a central role in setting the agenda. The absence of this type of analysis begs
the question of what is driving the prioritisation of trade issues on the WTO
agenda, other than a mélange of prevailing orthodoxies and the momentum of
special-interest groups?
This paper attempts to support progress towards a development-friendly agree-
ment by reviewing the potential beneﬁts and costs of liberalisation across various
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trade and factor ﬂows. We review the evidence on the global and developing
country welfare effects of liberalisation in four areas: agricultural trade; services;
the temporary movement of natural persons; and manufactured goods trade. This
analysis is a ﬁrst step to ensure that priority is given to those elements of the
agenda that deliver the largest gains to developing countries.
WTO negotiations are complex, slow and prone to the kinds of setbacks
exhibited at Cancun. For small and poor countries, the human and ﬁnancial
resources required to participate in negotiations and research issues are relatively
high. So a second motive for comparative analysis is therefore to ensure that the
WTO focuses on capturing the ‘low hanging fruit’ and avoids protracted disputes
over issues of lesser value. Reform proposals should be prioritised with a view to
maximising the welfare gains for the marginal unit of effort.
Several conclusions which we believe are relatively robust emerge from the
empirical survey below.
First, the evidence suggests that there are gains still to be realised from a
market access agenda. As summarised in Figure 2, a large share of these potential
gains could accrue to developing countries. This underscores the value of multi-
lateral trade negotiations and the importance of getting the Doha Round back on
track.
Second, the size of potential gains from liberalisation in different areas gives
cause for a re-evaluation of the current focus of negotiations. The estimated
welfare gains from those negotiating areas which consume considerable attention
are estimated to yield smaller beneﬁts than other reforms on which there has been
less progress.
A development-friendly market access agenda would focus more attention
on increasing the international mobility of unskilled workers. It would also recog-
nise that there is unﬁnished business in the liberalisation of industrial goods,
particularly related to the persistent protection of labour-intensive manufactures.
While there are signiﬁcant gains available from reform in agriculture and ser-
vices, these sectors require a ﬁne grained approach – which balances the price
effects of producers and consumers in developing countries – if liberalisation is
to deliver maximum gains to developing countries.
The Doha Round contains a large set of non-market access issues, which
might also offer important beneﬁts to developing countries.1 These non-market
access issues are not the subject of this paper.
1 For a brief review of non-market access priorities in the Doha Round, see Stiglitz and Charlton
(2004).
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2. PRIOR HYPOTHESES
As developing countries enter the trade negotiations, the natural question to ask
is what agreement would make the most difference for them, i.e., what should
they be trying to get?
The two most important features which distinguish developed from less
developed countries are factor endowments and the extent and nature of market
imperfections. Developing countries are abundant in unskilled labour; their great-
est shortage is in the ownership of physical capital and the accumulation of
knowledge and technology. Developing countries are disproportionately in the
tropics2 and, currently, are more engaged in the export of commodities, including
natural resources. For these and other reasons, developing countries differ in the
products that they export and import. Thus decisions about which goods and
services to liberalise, and for which there should be restrictions on subsidies, can
make a great deal of difference to the global distribution of welfare following
trade liberalisation.
There has been a dramatic transformation in the industrial pattern of the
global economy. In the nineteenth century, the advanced industrial economies
transformed themselves from agriculture into manufacturing. Now, they are trans-
forming themselves from manufacturing economies into service and knowledge
economies.3 Meanwhile, the developing world itself is divided into several groups:
subsistence agriculture (much of Africa); export agriculture (particularly Brazil
and Argentina); and those breaking out of agriculture and becoming increasingly
centred on manufacturing.
For the agricultural exporters, the failure to liberalise trade in agriculture and
to remove subsidies has been particularly costly. Trade-distorting measures of
industrialised nations displace the agricultural exports of developing countries.
By suppressing world prices,4 these policies have a direct effect on farm incomes.
Diao, Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson (2003) report that protectionism and subsidies
by industrialised nations cost developing countries about US$24 billion annually
in lost agricultural and agro-industrial income.5 Moreover, there may be dynamic
2 Geographical features of developing countries may have a large effect on their development
experiences; see Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998).
3 Today, only 14 per cent of employment and output in the United States is in manufacturing, and
the fraction in Europe is not much higher. Developed countries’ share of world trade in manufac-
tures has fallen from 90 per cent in 1970 to 72 per cent in 2000 (World Bank, 2002).
4 Estimates of the downward impact on world prices caused by OECD domestic support are
between 3.5 and 5 per cent for many agricultural commodities including wheat & other coarse
grains and oilseeds (Dimaranan et al., 2003).
5 According to their estimates, Latin America and the Caribbean lose about US$8.3 billion in
annual income from agriculture, Asia loses some US$6.6 billion, and sub-Saharan Africa close to
US$2 billion. Their estimates do not include dynamic effects.
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effects when investment is suppressed in countries whose trade is affected by
OECD support. Consequently, agricultural reform will be a key component of a
Development Round.
While agriculture is important for most developing countries,6 many have
dramatically diversiﬁed their industries and moved up the value-added ladder. In
low income countries, the share of manufactures in total exports rose from 20 per
cent in 1981 to more than 80 per cent in 2001. Much of this effect is due to the
remarkable growth of the two largest developing countries, India and China, but
even an unweighted average across the low income countries shows a rise from
25 per cent to 50 per cent (World Bank, 2004). Over the same period, growth in
exports of primary commodities has been relatively weak in low income coun-
tries (2 per cent per annum) and far outstripped by the growth of processed
agriculture (8 per cent) and textiles (15 per cent).7 Thus, developing countries
have a strong interest in the further liberalisation of manufactured goods.
In addition to the liberalisation of trade in goods, differences in factor pay-
ments across countries provide evidence that factor movements would increase
global productivity. If factor payments equal marginal products,8 then the largest
discrepancies are associated with the payments to unskilled labour, then to skilled
labour, and lastly to capital. Accordingly, agreements that provide for the mobil-
ity of unskilled labour would do most to increase global efﬁciency.
Another consideration is the pervasiveness of market imperfections in devel-
oping countries. The general argument in favour of trade liberalisation is that
it allows the expansion of the size of markets, allowing the global economy to
take further advantage of the economies of scale (the argument Adam Smith put
forward more than 200 years ago), and it enhances global efﬁciency in produc-
tion and exchange. The factor price equalisation theorem stipulates conditions
under which trade in goods and services leads to full global efﬁciency, substitut-
ing for the free mobility of factors. However, those conditions are highly restric-
tive and the standard argument that trade liberalisation necessarily makes all
countries better off (though not necessarily all individuals within each country)
is predicated on a set of assumptions that may not be satisﬁed in many develop-
ing countries: full employment, perfect competition, and perfect capital and risk
markets. In many developing countries where unemployment is high and markets
are imperfect, trade liberalisation may have different effects to those anticipated
in simple models, and these should inﬂuence the agenda of negotiations.
6 Agriculture accounts for 40 per cent of GDP in developing countries and 70 per cent of employ-
ment (World Bank, 2002).
7 These numbers are similar for the low income group after excluding India and China. Growth for
the other low income countries only was 7 per cent in processed agriculture and 14 per cent in
textiles (World Bank, 2004).
8 They may not, and the disparity between factor payments and the value of marginal products may
differ across countries, if the degree of market imperfections differs.
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3. COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
The bulk of useful regional-level empirical studies use computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models. We do not place much faith in the actual values
derived from CGE analysis,9 but they do highlight many interesting general
equilibrium effects and enable us to draw inferences from comparisons across
alternative scenarios. These models enable us to observe the effects of various
liberalisation experiments on trade volumes, prices and incomes. Simulations
can separately determine the effects of reform on different sectors and on differ-
ent countries and regions. The connection between exogenous trade reforms and
welfare outcomes is complex, and determined in CGE models by the scope and
functional form of the model and values of demand elasticities and other key
parameters.
Table 1 summarises the results of recent CGE studies of various liberalisa-
tion scenarios. Results differ quite widely even across similar experiments. This
variation has several sources. One is that the models differ signiﬁcantly in scope
– in the number and range of sectors and regions considered. The models also
differ in structure: constant returns to scale versus increasing returns, perfect
versus imperfect competition, as well as choosing different baseline scenarios.
In services, the models are sensitive to fairly unreliable estimates of the size of
government trade restrictions in the services sector.
CGE models have several limitations, and often do not incorporate key fea-
tures of developing countries. In particular CGE models often do not account
for the presence of persistent unemployment in developing countries. In the
presence of unemployment, trade liberalisation may simply move workers from
low productivity protected sectors into unemployment. This lowers the country’s
national income and increases poverty. There can be multiplier effects, so that the
total impact is far greater than the direct effect. Much of the opposition to trade
liberalisation arises because of the perceived effects on unemployment. In more
developed countries, monetary and ﬁscal policy should, in principle, enable the
country to maintain close to full employment. However, in many developing
countries, with persistent unemployment10 government policies might be unable
to maintain full employment. Even if trade liberalisation had no impact on the
equilibrium level of unemployment, it may take the economy considerable time
to adjust, and the costs of adjustments – lost income and increased poverty – may
be considerable.
9 CGE models were widely criticised following the Uruguay Round for what were subsequently
perceived to be overestimates of the gains from the round. For a discussion see Safadi and Laird
(1996).
10 In 2001 average unemployment rates reached 14.4 per cent in Africa, 12.6 per cent in transition



















































Estimates of Welfare Effects from Multilateral Trade Liberalisation




Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001) (i) Removing all agricultural supports and protections 31 3
♠ ♣  ** (ii) Removing all tariffs 25 6
(iii) Removing domestic supports in the developed countries 3 –2
(iv) Removing export subsidies, worldwide 0 –2
Hertel, Anderson, Francois and Martin (1999) ♣  * (i) 40 per cent reduction in all agricultural protection 70 15
(ii) Same excluding production subsidies 60 15
Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2003) (i) Full liberalisation of border measures 97 25
♠ ♣  ** (ii) Liberalisation of OECD border measures 39 4
(iii) Liberalisation of non-OECD border measures 59 21
(iv) Full liberalisation of OECD domestic support 12 –2
Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoeckman and (i) Full liberalisation of all protection 165 43
Martin (2000) (ii) Full liberalisation of all protection in OECD 122 31
♠ ♣  * (iii) Full liberalisation of all protection in non-OECD 43 12
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001) ♠ ♥ § * 33 per cent reduction in post-Uruguay protection of agriculture –3 –16
Dee and Hanslow (2000) ♥ § 4 Elimination of all post-Uruguay trade barriers in agriculture 50
UNCTAD (2003) (i) 50 per cent cut in all agricultural tariffs 22 10
♠ ♣  ** (ii) Elimination of export subsidies in agriculture –2 –6
(iii) Tariffs are reduced by 50 per cent on processed agriculture 12 6
Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney (2003) ♣  (i) 50 per cent reduction in OECD domestic support — –0.4
Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002) ♠  (i) 50 per cent cut in all agricultural tariffs 14 2
(ii) 50 per cent cut in domestic support 0.3 –0.2
Services
Hertel, Anderson, Francois and Martin (1999) ♣  * 40 per cent cut in business services and construction protection 22 6


















































Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2003) (i) Full liberalisation of border measures 53 15
♠ ♣  ** (ii) Liberalisation of OECD border measures 38 5
(iii) Liberalisation of non-OECD border measures 15 11
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001) ♠ ♥ § * 33 per cent reduction in post-Uruguay protection of services 414 71
Dee and Hanslow (2000) ♥ § 4 Elimination of all post-Uruguay trade barriers in services 135 133 (45 ©)
Verikios and Zhang (2004) 4 § ♠ Full trade liberalisation in telecommunications 24 18
Manufacturing
Hertel, Anderson, Francois and Martin (1999) ♣  * 40 per cent reduction in mining and manufacturing tariffs 70 51 (28 ©)
Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2003) (i) 50 per cent liberalisation of border measures 17 15
♠ ♣  ** (ii) 50 per cent liberalisation of OECD border measures 16 8
(iii) 50 per cent liberalisation of non-OECD border measures 12 –6
Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoeckman and (i) Full liberalisation of all protection in textiles 17 12
Martin (2000) (ii) Full liberalisation of textiles in OECD 3 3
♠ ♣  * (iii) Full liberalisation of textiles in non-OECD 14 9
(iv) Full liberalisation of all protection on other manuf. 70 50
(v) Full liberalisation of other manuf. in OECD 14 22
(vi) Full liberalisation of other manuf. in non-OECD 55 28
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001) ♠ ♥ § * 33 per cent reduction in post-Uruguay tariffs on manufactures 163 50
Dee and Hanslow (2000) ♥ § 4 Elimination of all post-Uruguay trade barriers in manuf. 80 —
Labour Mobility
Walmsley and Winters (2002) Developed countries receive extra 3 per cent of their labour 156 78
forces in TMNP
Winters (2001) 50 million developing country workers employed in 300 —
developed countries each year
Scollay and Gilbert (2001)  * Complementary effect of increased labour mobility on full 127 42
agricultural liberalisation
Model features: ♠ Static  Perfect competition * GTAP 4 database
 Dynamic § Monopolistic competition ** GTAP 5 database
♣ Constant returns to scale © Estimate with China removed 4 FTAP database
♥ Increasing returns to scale from sample — not calculated
Notes:
Welfare changes are measured in Equivalent Variation changes, i.e., by the money transfers necessary to make individuals indifferent between the status quo and the
post-reform situation.
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Another important assumption made in most of the analyses is that there is no
uncertainty. But changes in trade regimes affect countries’ exposure to risk. In
the absence of good insurance markets, there can be ﬁrst-order welfare effects
arising from this increased exposure to risk.11 For instance, with a quota, those
who compete with imports know precisely how much will be imported, and
therefore, if there is relatively little domestic volatility, they will face relative
little price uncertainty. But with the tarifﬁcation of quotas, countries are exposed
to considerably greater volatility.12
A third problem is that most of the tools used to analyse general equilibrium
effects of trade liberalisation are static models. They describe the movement from
one ‘steady state’ to another but do not incorporate the costs associated with
transition or the consequences for economies which are initially out of steady
state. Fourth, CGE models usually do not take pre-existing distortions into ac-
count. For instance, tax policies (often advocated by international institutions),
which effectively tax the informal sector less than the formal sector, already
distort production in favour of the informal sector. In this context, trade regimes
which further lower the international price of agricultural goods, typically pro-
duced by the informal sector, have a larger adverse effect than would be the case
if tax policy were more neutral.
Finally, CGE models do not address the fact that implementation and adjust-
ment costs are likely to be larger in developing countries. High unemployment
rates, weak safety nets, and poor risk markets are all features of developing
countries that have to be taken into account in conducting a comprehensive
relative incidence analysis. If trade liberalisation has a large effect on inequality,
then governments may be required to strengthen their redistributive welfare
system. Larger taxes generate increased deadweight loss, which reduces the efﬁ-
ciency gains from liberalisation.
Given these many deﬁciencies, we consider the results of CGE models with
considerable caution. It is important to take care to analyse estimates in the
context of the assumptions used to generate them and to be wary of comparisons
of estimates from different models. We present these models not because we
believe that they provide deﬁnitive results on the costs and beneﬁts of trade
liberalisation, but because they call attention to some of the key issues and
because they are one of the few evidence-based guides of the relative merits of
WTO proposals.
11 For instance, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977) show that the change from quotas to tariffs may
expose countries to much greater risk. Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) show that the adverse effects
from increased exposure to risk may be so much greater that everyone in both countries may be
worse off. See also Dixit (1989) for analysis of alternative risk scenarios.
12 The incidence, in this case, depends on the extent to which there are disturbances in the
domestic markets, and the extent to which the external disturbances are correlated with the domes-
tic disturbance.
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4. AGRICULTURE
The ‘development’ component of the Doha Round has come to be symbolised
by agricultural issues. Agriculture was the ﬁrst substantive item listed in the work
programme of the Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round, and it was
arguably at the centre of the failure at Cancun. Developing countries made it
clear both before13 and during14 the Cancun meeting that progress on agriculture
was their primary objective.15
This prioritisation raises two questions. First how important (relative to other
potential reforms) is agriculture for the welfare of developing countries, and
second, are the speciﬁc issues receiving attention within the agricultural agenda
the most important issues for development?
We make two points in this section. The ﬁrst is that agriculture, though import-
ant for developing countries, is not the only important issue, nor even the largest
potential area of welfare gains for developing countries. Aggregating the seven
studies of full agricultural liberalisation in Table 1, and controlling for the scope
of the experiments by scaling up the partial liberalisation results, we ﬁnd that the
average reported potential gain from agricultural liberalisation for all developing
countries is US$12 billion. This is by far the smallest of the average estimates
across the four areas considered in Figure 1. Moreover, despite the presumption
that agriculture is a ‘developing country’ issue, the empirical studies surveyed
suggest the proportion of absolute global gains accruing to developing countries
is 16 per cent in agriculture – a far less progressive result than for the other three
areas (Figure 2). As discussed earlier, there are several reasons why CGE studies
may understate the beneﬁts of agricultural reform, but the point is clear: agricul-
ture is not the only prize worth working towards in multilateral negotiations.
The second point is that there is some discrepancy between the type of agricul-
tural reforms being sought by developing countries and the type of agreement that
would be of most beneﬁt to them. Within agricultural negotiations, developing
countries have focused doggedly on the three issues speciﬁed in the Doha Minis-
terial Declaration:16 (a) substantial improvements in market access, (b) reductions
13 Section 7 of 6 June, 2003, Communication from Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala,
Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe (TN/C/W/13), makes it clear that ‘Reform of agricultural trade
is of central importance for many developing countries’ and is ‘an essential ingredient of the
negotiation and its outcome’ (original emphasis).
14 See the statements by Minister Celso Amorim of Brazil, speaking on behalf of G21 at the
Cancun plenary session of 13 September, 2003.
15 Oxfam (2000) argues that ‘agriculture is the key to unlocking the Doha development agenda,
and without constructive steps on this issue, the broader negotiations cannot really restart’.
16 Domestic support, market access and export competition were the ﬁrst, second and third listed
items respectively in the G21’s Framework for Establishing Modalities on Agriculture.
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FIGURE 1
Average Welfare Gains from Full Liberalisation Experiments in Agriculture, Manufacturing and
Services, and Partial Liberalisation of Labour* (US$bn)
FIGURE 2
Proportion of Welfare Gains Accruing to Developing Countries
Note: These ﬁgures are indicative only. Averages are extracted from imperfectly comparable models and
experiments.
* Labour mobility estimates based only on partial liberalisation experiment in Walmsley and Winters (2002)
which revised Winters (2001).
Source: Authors’ estimates from full and scaled-up partial liberalisation experiments listed in Table 1.
17 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, Section 13 (WTO, 2001).
of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies, (c) substantial
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.17 These issues (widely interpreted
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as imposing obligations primarily on protected markets in OECD countries)18
have shaped the expectations of developing countries for the round, and the
perceived lack of compromise from OECD countries has become a lightning rod
for critics of the developed countries’ trade policies.19
However, the empirical evidence gives some cause for doubt about the appro-
priateness of this agenda. Table 1 reports the results of four studies of the effects
of eliminating OECD domestic support for agriculture and two studies of the
effects of removing OECD export subsidies. All six estimates suggest these
reform measures would have a negative effect on aggregate welfare in develop-
ing countries. Yet these policies make up two of the three key positions adopted
by developing countries in their trade positions and one of the most common
demands made by pro-development NGOs.20 As we have discussed, these CGE
results are by no means deﬁnitive and, as we will shortly discuss, on closer
inspection they do not suggest that there is no development beneﬁt in OECD
agricultural reform.21 However, they do give cause for a thorough investigation
of the evidence.
The (national) real income effects of liberalisation are dominated by two
factors: (i) the change in allocative efﬁciency, and (ii) the change in terms of
trade. Gains from allocative efﬁciency are realised when market distortions are
removed, permitting the economy to reallocate its resources to the most productive
use. These beneﬁts accrue largely to the liberalising region itself. In agriculture
they are partially reﬂected in the large efﬁciency gains accruing to the highly
distorted agricultural markets in the EU, the US and Japan (where agricultural
producer support as a proportion of gross farm receipts is 36, 24 and 59 per cent
respectively). The terms of trade effect comes from changes in a country’s export
prices relative to its import prices.
18 In their Framework for Establishing Modalities on Agriculture, of 14 September, 2003, the G21
propose the requirement that ‘all developed country members having the higher trade distorting
subsidies making greater efforts’.
19 Oxfam (2000): ‘The international trade in food and agricultural products is highly distorted
and manipulated by more powerful trading nations, and in the process the impact on vulnerable
populations is neglected. Governments in Europe and the US may profess faith in free-trade
principles, but when it comes to agriculture there is a wide gulf between principle and practice’.
20 Oxfam (2000): ‘It is clear that in the interest of fair trade and a “level playing ﬁeld” agricultural
export subsidies should be banned’.
21 Eliminating developed country agricultural subsidies is likely to beneﬁt producers, and hurt
consumers in developing countries. In developing countries, the (net) producers (and the labourers
who rely on agricultural production) are among the poorest, so they are the ones who beneﬁt, even
if the country as a whole is a grain importer, so the country as a whole loses. Moreover, within
most developing countries, there are limited mechanisms of redistribution, so that it does not sufﬁce
to assess what happens on average. In addition, if the funds that the developed countries spend on
subsidies were diverted into aid, then even the consumers could presumably normally be made
better off.
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Developing countries face the beneﬁts of increased market access and the
(potential) costs of higher prices for domestic consumers. The fundamental point
is that consumers beneﬁt from lower prices that result from large agricultural
subsidies, and producers lose. The net effect of wide-ranging agricultural reform
varies across developing countries depending on the composition of their exports
and imports of different commodities, and the price sensitivity of those com-
modities to liberalisation. This analysis highlights the need for a more ﬁne-
grained approach, which would differentiate among crops and countries.
One important determinant of the net effect of this kind of reform is the level
of protection for each commodity and the consequent impact of liberalisation on
prices. Tariffs are particularly high in the feed grains, dairy and food grains
sectors, while dairy products, meat and livestock are the world’s most subsidised
exports. Producer payments are highest for grains and oilseed sectors and lowest
for meat, livestock and dairy (Hertel et al., 1999). Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney
(2003) examine the average world price impacts of cutting domestic support in
all industrialised countries for all agricultural commodities by 50 per cent. They
ﬁnd that domestic support has the largest upward effect on price for programme
crops (wheat, corn, barley, rice) and ruminant livestock (beef) while sugar and
dairy, which are mainly protected by tariffs, show small price declines.
The next important determinant of the welfare effects of liberalisation is the
agricultural trade balance across countries. There is a division between temperate
products (programme crops and livestock) where developing countries are largely
net importers and developed countries are largely net exporters, and tropical
products for which developing countries are largely net exporters. Most develop-
ing countries are net importers of programme crops,22 which are precisely the
commodities that have the highest domestic support and stand to experience the
largest price increases. It is therefore not surprising that most studies predict that
most developing countries are worse off as a result of the terms of trade effects
following this kind of reform. Indeed Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney (2003) ﬁnd
that gains accrue primarily to developed countries in the Cairns group as well as
the two largest developing country exporters, Argentina and Brazil. These coun-
tries are the strongest advocates for the existing agricultural reform agenda.
The existence of net losses for developing countries in some areas of reform
should not imply that no reform is required – rather it suggests that a selective
approach is needed. The most important subsidies to eliminate would be those
where the consumption beneﬁts are small relative to the production costs.
22 This includes Mexico, ‘Rest of South America’ (a regional average which excludes Argentina
and Brazil), China, Indonesia, Korea, ‘Rest of South Asia’ (a regional average which excludes
India), Tanzania, Zambia, ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ (a regional average which excludes Tanzania
and Zambia), and the average of the Middle East and North African countries. Brazil, India,
Argentina and Vietnam are net exporters (Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney, 2003).
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Developing countries should focus their attention of the elimination of tariffs
and quotas on tropical products, processed foods and other commodities which
they export or for which they have high export elasticities with respect to price.
Elimination of cotton subsidies would raise producer prices for cotton, but have a
small effect on standards of living in developing countries as a result of the small
increase in the price of cloth. Similarly, subsidies for crops which are dispropor-
tionately consumed by the wealthy will have the least adverse distributional
effects. Soy beans, for instance, may largely go into the production of animals
(beef and chicken).
Finally, developing countries should reﬂect on the items that are missing in the
Doha Declaration. First, the Declaration does not foreshadow further attempts to
reduce export dumping. Second, one of developing countries’ most important
proposals, the ‘development box’ that would allow poor countries to shape their
farming and food policies to maximise development, is also absent.
5. TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognises four modes
of service delivery. The temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) has
received by far the smallest attention in terms of the volume of scheduled conces-
sions. Yet differences in factor payments across countries provide evidence
that factor movements would increase global productivity. If factor payments
equal marginal products,23 then the largest discrepancies are associated with the
payments to unskilled labour, then to skilled labour, and lastly to capital. Accord-
ingly, agreements that provide for the mobility of unskilled labour would do most
to increase global efﬁciency.
At the same time, such agreements would signiﬁcantly improve living stand-
ards in developing countries through the remittances that they would generate,24
through the accumulation of capital which would be repatriated when such
individuals return to the country of origin, and through the general equilibrium
effects on relative factor supplies within the developing countries. The temporary
movement of less skilled workers from developing countries (where they are in
oversupply) to developed countries (where they are relatively undersupplied)25 is
23 They may not, and the disparity between factor payments and the value of marginal products
may differ across countries, if the degree of market imperfections differs.
24 In 2002, the Inter-American Development Bank reported $32 billion in remittances sent to the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. This was far greater than total ODI and only slightly
less than foreign direct investment (Ellerman, 2003).
25 Foreign workers can be an important source of labour in developed countries. London’s catering
industry depends on migrants for 70 per cent of its labour force and a large proportion of seasonal
agricultural workers are foreign (Home Ofﬁce, 2001).
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estimated to increase world welfare by hundreds of billions of dollars, even if the
scale of the labour ﬂow was modest. The empirical studies surveyed in Table 1
suggest that an expanded Mode 4 could generate large welfare gains from relat-
ively limited reform. Walmsley and Winters (2002) estimate that a ﬂow of workers
to developed countries equivalent to 3 per cent of their labour forces would
generate a global welfare gain of US$156 billion. For these reasons a development
round of trade negotiations should accordingly focus on what can be done to
facilitate migration of unskilled labour and surrogates for unskilled labour – trade
in unskilled-intensive commodities and services.
Yet despite the tremendous development potential of this reform, the limited
progress that has been made in this area has been largely associated with the
intra-corporate movement of skilled personnel – an issue of interest to developed
countries. Thus far, Mode 4 has not progressed in a way that allows developing
countries to use their comparative advantage in low and medium skill labour-
intensive services. To make progress toward unlocking the potential beneﬁts of
labour mobility, WTO members should seek to expand and facilitate subcontract-
ing, abolish economic needs tests, reduce administration costs for migrant workers
and extend temporary worker schemes to agriculture and manufacturing.
Developed countries could also do more to facilitate remittances. Governments
have a role to play in maximising both the value of remittances and their impact
on development. Efforts to formalise the structure of remittance ﬂow (much of
which currently moves through informal channels) could make it easier, safer
and cheaper to transfer funds. For example, governments could ensure migrants
have access to secure and low-cost ﬁnancial services and regulate remittance-
handling intermediaries to prevent malpractices. As well as increasing the ﬂow of
remittances, remittance policies can improve the development impact of remit-
tances at the receiving end. For example, micro-ﬁnance and micro-enterprise
support initiatives have encouraged remittance-receiving clients (especially small
businesses) to access credit and savings accounts.26 Finally, the further develop-
ment of remittance-backed bonds could help liquidity-constrained developing
countries to use future ﬂows of remittances to raise external ﬁnance relatively
cheaply.27
26 For an example initiative in this area see the case of the ﬁnancial institution PRODEM in Bolivia
which focuses on the promotion of savings and the offer of new ﬁnancial services to remittance
receivers; see UNDP (2003). A number of best practice scenarios from Latin America and Asia
were presented and documented in the November 2000 ILO conference in Geneva on ‘Making the
Best of Globalization: Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-ﬁnance’.
27 In 2001, Banco do Brasil issued $300 million worth of bonds through Merrill Lynch using the
future yen remittances from Brazilian workers in Japan as collateral. The terms of these bonds were
more favourable than those available on sovereign issues (with a BBB+ Standard & Poor’s rating
compared to BB− on Brazil’s sovereign foreign currency rating). For a review of securitisation of
remittance ﬂows see Ketkar and Ratha (2000).
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6. MANUFACTURING
The signiﬁcant liberalisation of manufacturing tariffs in developed countries
over the last two decades might suggest that there is little to gain from further
negotiations on industrial products. However, if this is true to some extent for
developed countries, it is certainly not the case for developing countries. While
average developed country tariff rates are low, they maintain high barriers to
many of the goods exported most intensively by developing countries. When
weighted by import volumes, developing countries face average manufacturing
tariffs of 3.4 per cent on their exports to developed countries, more than four
times higher than the average rate faced by goods from developed countries,
0.8 per cent (Hertel and Martin, 2000).
Moreover, aggregate data hide the existence of tariff peaks. In the United
States, post-Uruguay-Round tariff rates on more than half of textile and clothing
imports are between 15 and 35 per cent, while in Japan 22 per cent of textile
imports face tariffs of 10–15 per cent (UNCTAD, 1996). Similarly in the pro-
cessed food sector, Canadian, Japanese and EU tariffs on fully processed food
are 42, 65 and 24 per cent respectively. By contrast, the least processed products
face tariffs of 3, 35 and 15 per cent in these countries (World Bank, 2002). Such
tariff peaks are manifestly unfair and have a particularly pernicious effect on
development by restricting industrial diversiﬁcation in the poorest countries.
A second reason that developing countries should be pushing to have indus-
trial tariffs prioritised in the Doha Agenda is that barriers to south-south trade are
quite high. The average import-weighted tariff on the exports of manufactured
goods from developing countries to developing countries is 12.8 per cent (Hertel
and Martin, 2000). Anderson et al. (2000) estimate that the welfare gains to
developing countries derived from the liberalisation of trade in manufactures by
other developing countries is US$31 billion.
The average estimate of the potential gain to developing countries from full manu-
facturing liberalisation experiments in Table 1 is US$90 billion.28 The estimates
vary widely among studies but are in general higher than the gains from agricultural
reform. In addition, developing countries get a larger proportion of the gains from
liberalisation of manufacturing trade than they do from other reforms (Figure 2).
7. SERVICES
The studies in Table 1 report very large potential gains from the liberalisation
of services. For agricultural and manufacturing, most CGE models report results
28 These ﬁgures should be interpreted with caution. The gains from partial liberalisation scenarios
were linearly scaled up for the purpose of indicative comparison.
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dominated by two main effects – allocative efﬁciency gains and changes in terms
of trade. For services liberalisation, movements of capital across borders generate
additional effects. First, foreign direct investment inﬂows and outﬂows can lead
to an expansion or contraction in the capital stock located within a region and
changes in capital endowments affect national income. A second effect on income
works through the rents earned on foreign direct investment. Rents are created by
barriers to services trade which fall during liberalisation. In some models, rents
on output are separated from rents on ownership. Rents on output are retained
by incumbent ﬁrms and accrue to the selling region whereas rents on ownership
are transferred away to the region of ownership. Liberalisation of services thus
affects the distribution of the capital stock and affects the returns to that stock.
The bulk of the empirical studies surveyed below suggest that the liberalisa-
tion of services could yield signiﬁcant welfare gains – much larger than the gains
from agricultural or manufactured goods. The estimates are large because protec-
tion levels are high in the service sector, and services make up a large (and
growing) share of world trade. Additionally services are key inputs into the
production of almost all goods.
However, the large predicted gains from service sector liberalisation have to
be weighed against the relative complexity of service sector reform where the
identiﬁcation and elimination of trade barriers is signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult than
in merchandise trade. In particular, three concerns commonly arise. First, there is
a view that only a small fraction of service sector reform is actionable through
WTO negotiations. Second, several important elements of the reform agenda
(particularly liberalisation of restrictions on foreign direct investment within Mode
3 service delivery)29 are successfully progressing through unilateral policy changes
outside the WTO. Third, multilateral commitments within the WTO are seen by
several developing countries as a particularly blunt instrument of reform, lacking
the ﬂexibility to deal with the country-speciﬁc implementation challenges thrown
up by liberalisation in the service sector. Together these concerns contribute to
the continued low priority given to GATS commitments within the overall agenda.
This is unfortunate because it undervalues the signiﬁcant and growing service
export interests of developing countries and also because it has drawn attention
away from those policy proposals (scattered throughout the agenda) which could
facilitate and improve the effectiveness of unilateral reform in developing countries.
Many developing countries have large and growing export interests which could
be pursued in the Doha Round. The substantial growth in offshore outsourcing
(Modes 1 and 2)30 has led to high growth rates of exports from developing
29 Mode 3 refers to trade in services delivered through foreign commercial presence, particularly
foreign subsidiaries of multinational ﬁrms.
30 Service delivery through Modes 1 and 2 refer to cross-border supply and consumption abroad
respectively.
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countries in particularly business services31 and ICT, but also in health, education
and audiovisual services. Barriers to trade in these areas include national author-
isation, local authentication requirements and regulatory standards. There is
signiﬁcant scope for liberalisation in Mode 1, which lags behind Mode 3 both
in terms of the number and scope of commitments. The Uruguay Round left
many areas of Mode 1 trade without bound commitments. A large proportion of
commitments provided only partial market access (60 per cent in legal services;
78 per cent in voice telephone services; 41 per cent in accounting; see Matoo and
Wunsch, 2004). In several areas where developing countries have a comparative
advantage there is a case for broad formulaic rules in favour of national treatment
and increased market access.
At the same time there are other non-market access reforms which could
complement service sector reform and increase the beneﬁts available to develop-
ing countries. The tourism sector (Mode 2) is one of the most important sources
of foreign exchange for many developing countries. While the sector is generally
quite liberal in terms of government restrictions,32 developing countries suffer
from rampant anti-competitive activities within the industry which minimise
spillover and multiplier effects. In this and other areas (for example, maritime
transport), an effective multilateral anti-trust framework could deliver large gains
to developing countries and support further unilateral liberalisation.
The same is true in Mode 3 liberalisation where the enthusiasm for FDI in the
cross-country empirical literature is tempered by negative experiences at the
national level. While it is true that the unilateral liberalisation of restrictions on
foreign investment continues apace without multilateral action, there are nonethe-
less several opportunities for WTO action which could increase the beneﬁts that
developing countries derive from the liberalisation of FDI. For example, develop-
ing countries’ experiences with FDI could be improved by agreements to limit
the adverse consequences of competition for investment through ﬁscal and ﬁnancial
incentives33 and also by agreements to allow for anti-trust enforcement between
jurisdictions.
Another problem is that, in many cases, the ramiﬁcations of the particular
measure extend well beyond the impacts on trade. Inevitably, then, debates about
service sector liberalisation devolve into fundamental debates about national
economic and social policy. Should the media, for instance, be controlled by a
few rich, foreign ﬁrms, who are able to use their wealth to control the ﬂow of
information to the citizenry? A further concern is that many service sector
31 In India exports of business services grew by 43 per cent between 1995 and 2000 (Matoo and
Wunsch, 2004).
32 There have been a high number of commitments in major tourism sectors. In particular hotels
and restaurants (123 members). See WTO (1999).
33 For a discussion of harmful tax practices see OECD (1998). For welfare losses from inter-
national tax competition see Charlton (2003).
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liberalisations might have social consequences for the poor, for example, by
increasing prices of essential services or by reducing access. Opening up markets
has been accompanied at times by a reduction in competition, and an increase
in prices;34 in the case of ﬁnancial services, there are even allegations that the
supply of credit to medium and small domestic enterprises has been reduced.
Private ﬁrms may be less willing to engage in cross-subsidisation of market
segments in poor and rural areas. Even if liberalisation leads to lower average
costs through increased competitiveness and efﬁciency, prices for some end-users
may rise. The WTO could promote service sector liberalisation by acting to
mitigate (or at least not exacerbating) these concerns through other parts of the
agenda. For example, regulatory agreements which constrain the ability of gov-
ernments to avail themselves of appropriate industrial, social and redistributive
policies might reduce the incentive for governments to engage in liberalisation
programmes which entail adjustment costs.
Service sector reform offers large beneﬁts to developing countries but is not
receiving commensurate attention in the Doha Round. Yet there is much that the
WTO could do to unlock welfare gains from service sector reform including
pursuing the developing countries’ market access agenda in labour-intensive and
outsourced services and in promoting reform in other parts of the agenda to
amplify the beneﬁts of service sector liberalisation and limit its costs.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has surveyed empirical evidence from one type of empirical study
with a view to determining a development-friendly prioritisation of the Doha
Round market access agenda across four major market access issues. Computable
general equilibrium studies, despite their manifold deﬁciencies, provide the best
available estimates (properly interpreted to account for their assumptions) with
which to compare the cross-country effects of reform proposals.
The ﬁrst conclusion from the empirical review in Table 1 is that the Doha
Round is worth pursuing for the large welfare gains it has the potential to deliver.
However, to some extent, Figures 1 and 2 give cause for a re-evaluation of
developing countries’ priorities for the round.
A second conclusion is that a true development round has to go well beyond
agriculture. Despite the common view that agriculture is the dominant development
34 For example, privatisation of utilities – such as South Africa’s experience of granting its newly
privatised telecommunications utility Telekom a ﬁve-year monopoly – can lead to inefﬁcient
services. Similarly the poor regulation of ﬁnancial sectors across South East Asia contributed to
instability prior to the crises of the late 1990s. Poor electricity deregulation has led to problems in
many countries.
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issue, developing countries clearly have interests in other areas. The agenda must
include agriculture because, for the reasons outlined in Section 4, successful
agricultural reform will have a large development impact. Also there can be no
principled trade agreement without including agriculture and, as a consequence,
it has taken on enormous symbolic value. At the same time developing countries
should also be pushing for progressive market access reform in manufactured
goods, particularly the elimination of tariff peaks on labour-intensive goods;
and for (carefully implemented) reform in some key service industries; and for
signiﬁcant progress in unskilled labour mobility.
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